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EXTENDING THE PATENT MONOPOLY TO
UNPATENTED NONSTAPLE GOODS-
DAWSON CHEMICAL CO. V. ROHM & HAAS CO.
"With this [opinion], we have about exhausted our present capac-
ity for rational thinking on patent matters. As we noted during oral
argument of this case, patent cases are the only cases argued by
professionals and decided by amateurs."
Congress established the system of granting a legal monopoly to the owner
of a patented invention to promote technological innovation.I To protect
the integrity of the legal monopoly, a patent owner may bring an infringe-
ment suit against persons making, using, or selling a patented invention
without permission. 2 If the patentee misuses the patent, however, he or she
will be barred from obtaining relief against infringement of the invention. 3
An attempt to extend a patent monopoly to embrace unpatented articles is
generally regarded as a misuse of the patent. 4 Congress first codified certain
*Bohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1, 19 (5th
Cir. 1979), af.f'd, 448 U.S. 176, 206 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1980).
1. The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact laws that establish a patent system:
"The Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8. The fundamental objective of the patent law is to encourage efforts to advance the
state of science and technology. The patent law is also directed toward supporting disclosure of
advances in knowledge that will benefit society. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.,
325 U.S. 327, 330-31, 65 U.S.P.Q. 297, 299 (1945). In exchange for disclosing the specifics of a
new invention to the public through the patent application, the law provides that "[e]very
patent shall contain . . .a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen
years ... of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout
the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). See generally Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488, 492, 52 U.S.P.Q. 30, 32 (1942) (grant to an inventor of a special patent monopoly
effectuates the public policy of promoting innovation).
2. See note 20 injra.
3. See B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 497-98, 52 U.S.P.Q. 33, 35 (1942) (use of
patent as means of establishing a limited monopoly in unpatented materials held sufficient
reason to dismiss patent owner's infringement suit); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488, 493, 52 U.S.P.Q. 30, 32 (1942) (courts of equity may decline to entertain an infringement
suit when the owner used the patent to restrain competition through an extension of the patent
monopoly to unpatented articles); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463, 36
U.S.P.Q. 35, 36 (1938) (patent owner is denied relief against infringement when he seeks to
effect an unauthorized extension of the monopoly); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-34, 8 U.S.P.Q. 211, 214 (1931) (the patent owner is denied relief when he
employs a patent in an attempt to secure a limited monopoly over unpatented material).
4. See Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463, 36 U.S.P.Q. 35, 36 (1938) (every
use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly over unpatented articles declared
invalid); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33, 8 U.S.P.Q. 211, 213-
14 (1931) (control over the supply of unpatented material is beyond the scope of the patentee's
monopoly); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917)
(every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent and an extension of
the patent monopoly beyond the inherent limits is forbidden). See generally Scafetta, Ten Years
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aspects of the judicially created doctrines of infringement and patent misuse
in the Patent Act of 1952. 5 Since its enactment, federal courts have strug-
gled to determine the type of conduct that ought to be characterized as
patent misuse under the Act."
Recently, in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 7 the United
States Supreme Court first interpreted 8 section 271 of the Act,9 regarding the
After Aro I1: The Effect of Patent Act Section 271 on the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 58 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 69 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Scafetta]; Nelson, Mercoid-Type Misuse Is Alive, 56 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 134 (1974); Note, Contributory Infringement and Misuse- The Effect of Section 271
of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1953); Note, Combination Patents: The Right
to Prohibit Sales of Replacement Parts, 70 YALE L.J. 649 (1961); Note, Section 271(b) of the
Patent Act of 1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132 (1956).
5. Congress codified all the patent laws under a single title with the enactment of the 1952
Patent Act, Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 950, 66 Stat. 792. All current statutory law
pertaining to patents is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976). The codification of the judicial
doctrine of contributory infringement and aspects of patent misuse appear at 35 U.S.C. § 271
(1976). No statutes encompassed either of these doctrines until the passage of the Patent Act of
1952. See Scafetta, supra note 4.
6. Compare Buston, Inc. v. Julen, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 697, 140 U.S.P.Q. 181 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (licensing agreement deemed valid and no misuse found when patentee manufactured and
sold unpatented component of a patented invention) and Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec., 146 F.
Supp. 625, 111 U.S.P.Q. 203 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (held not patent misuse when patentee granted
implied licenses under the patent by selling an unpatented nonstaple component) with Ansul Co.
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 169 U.S.P.Q. 759 (2d Cir. 1971) (patent owner found guilty of
patent misuse for using patent to force users to purchase an unpatented component) and
Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Jackson Vibrators, 153 U.S.P.Q. 777 (N.D. I11. 1967) (patent owner
would have been guilty of misuse despite § 271(d) if users had not been permitted licenses
without purchasing unpatented goods).
7. 448 U.S. 176, 206 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1980).
8. Before Dawson, the Supreme Court had indirectly considered what conduct should be
characterized as patent misuse in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476, 141 U.S.P.Q. 681 (1964). The Aro Court stated that the question of patent misuse was not
an issue in the case but remarked that § 271 had been enacted to reinstate the doctrine that was
contained in the Mercoid opinions (discussed in notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra). The
Court cited §§ 271(c) and (d) as examples of how Congress intended to change the judicially
created law of patents, but the scope of these sections was not discussed in depth. Id. at 491-92,
141 U.S.P.Q. at 688.
9. Section 271 provides in pertinent part:
§ 271 Infringement of patent
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or
authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would
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scope and interaction of patent misuse and contributory infringement. A
closely divided Court 10 held that a patent owner has a statutory right to
eliminate competitors in the sale of unpatented nonstaple 1" goods essential to
the patented invention.' 2  Further, the Court declared that the patent
owner's use of a tying arrangement 13 was protected by the statute.14
The Dawson decision represents a questionable departure from the princi-
ple that a patent monopoly is limited to the boundaries of the invention
itself.' -5 Moreover, a tying arrangement, previously condemned as an illicit
attempt to extend the patent monopoly,' 6 is now recognized as a legitimate
agreement. Failing to abide by previously endorsed principles of statutory
construction, the Dawson Court improperly relied upon an uncertain legisla-
tive history to sustain its decision. This Note offers a suggested approach as a
more cautious and balanced resolution of the conflicting policy questions
presented in Dawson. In addition, the decision's impact is assessed, particu-
larly regarding the potential adverse consequences it portends for free mar-
ket competition in unpatented nonstaple goods.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Contributory Infringement versus Patent Misuse
The language of section 271 of the Patent Act represents the congressional
effort to codify the doctrine of contributory infringement as well as certain
exceptions to the doctrine of misuse. 17 These two doctrines are judicial
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent
rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c)(d) (1976).
10. Dawson was a five to four decision, with two dissenting opinions. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens joined in the dissent written by Justice White. 448 U.S. at 223-40, 206
U.S.P.Q. at 408-15 (1980). Justice Stevens also wrote a brief dissent. Id. at 240-41, 206 U.S.P.Q.
at 415.
11. No decision has been found that attempts to define the word "nonstaple" as it is used
among patent lawyers. The word is a term of art in patent law and is generally recognized as a
substitute for the phrase "not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use" that appears in § 271(c) of the Patent Act of 1952. Nonstaple is a term used to
refer to unpatented components of an invention that have no substantial commercial use outside
the patented device. See Scafetta, supra note 4, at 72-73 n.12.
12. 448 U.S. at 201-02, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
13. A tying scheme is defined as "an arrangement under which a vendor will sell one product
only on the condition that the buyer also purchases another and different product." BLACK'S LAW
DIcrHoNnaY 1329 (5th rev. ed. 1979). In the context of patent licensing, the tying agreement is
accomplished by conditioning the licensing of the patent (the tying product) upon the licensee's
purchase of the unpatented components of the invention (the tied product). See generally Bauer,
A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 283 (1980).
14. 448 U.S. at 213-14, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 404.
15. See note 33 infra.
16. See notes 38 & 39 infra.
17. Congress conducted three sets of hearings on the proposed legislation that eventually
became the Patent Act of 1952. See note 76 injra. Witnesses informed the congressional commit-
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creations that originated at different periods during the Court's history.' 8 It
is essential to trace the origin and development of contributory infringement
and patent misuse to understand the policy objectives of each and to evaluate
the congressional purpose in enacting section 271.
The doctrine of contributory infringement '1 permits a patent owner to
proceed against those who engage in conduct which itself does not constitute
direct infringement 20 but instead facilitates direct infringement by others.',
In 1894, the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment in Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co. ,22
but was reluctant to recognize any derivative right to control exclusively the
unpatented elements of a patented invention.2 3
tees that the purpose of the new law was to restore a limited version of the contributory
infringement doctrine while exempting certain conduct from the purview of patent misuse. See
Hearings on H.R. 3866 before Subcomin. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-17 (1949). The statutory codification of contributory infringement and
exceptions to the patent misuse doctrine appear at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c), (d) (1976). See note 9
supra.
18. The contributory infringement doctrine was first enunciated in Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F.
Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100), and first endorsed by the Supreme Court in Morgan
Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894). The Court
established the patent misuse doctrine in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243
U.S. 502 (1917). See Note, Contributory Infringement and Misuse-The Effect of Section 271 of
the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HAnv. L. REV. 909 (1953).
19. The statutory definition of contributory infringement appears in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(1976). See note 9 supra.
20. Direct infringement is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976), which provides: -[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."
id.
21. Contributory infringement is essentially an application of the old common law doctrine
of joint tortfeasors and imposes liability on those who aid or abet another in an act of direct
infringement. 7 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 515 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as DELLER]. The doctrine is used to ensure the continued vitality of a patentee's legal monopoly
by preventing a competitor from manufacturing an incomplete version of the patented invention
and marketing the device for buyers to complete. See generally Note, Section 271(b) of the Patent
Act of 1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132 (1956).
As early as 1871, a court endorsed the contributory infringement doctrine. In Wallace v.
Holmes, 28 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100), the alleged infringer sold a burner
element for a patented oil lamp. The buyer of the burner element had only to add a glass
chimney to complete the patented lamp. The Wallace court did not characterize the conduct of
the accused infringer as contributory infringement, but the court's description of the activity
forms the basic principle and rationale for the doctrine. The court reasoned that persons who
manufacture parts of a patented combination and sell those parts with the intent that the buyer
will purchase the missing components to complete the device cannot escape liability for patent
infringement. Id. at 80. To permit such conduct, the court concluded, would render combina-
tion patents useless. Id.
22. 152 U.S. 425 (1894). The Court endorsed the principle that the manufacture and sale of
a single component of a patented invention with the intent that it be combined with the device's
remaining parts is an infringement of the patent. Id. at 433.
23. The availability of the contributory infringement action to protect the integrity of the
patent monopoly was acknowledged in the Morgan Envelope decision; however, the doctrine
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The Court resolved any indecision it may have had regarding the permissi-
ble scope of contributory infringement in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor
Talking Machine Co.24 In that case, the alleged contributory infringer had
sold specially designed phonograph records for use with a patented phono-
graph player. The record sold by the alleged infringer was not itself patented
but merely an element of the patented machine. The Court found that the
record sold to owners of the patented phonograph machine was incapable of
any use apart from the patented invention. The Leeds & Catlin Co. Court
held that a defendant may have engaged in contributory infringement al-
though the element of the patented invention that he sold was itself unpat-
ented. 25
The decision rendered three years later in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.
2
1
represents the most liberal interpretation and application of contributory
infringement. 27  The plaintiff manufacturer held a patent on a printing
machine and required purchasers of the device to agree to buy all supplies
necessary to operate the machine from the patent owner. The Court held
that the patent law afforded the patentee the right to condition the use of its
patented invention upon the subsequent purchase of unpatented supplies
that were not elements of the patented machine. 28  This decision expanded
the patent owner's power to control the market in unpatented goods used
with the patented device. The Court implicitly endorsed an extention of the
monopoly power to articles outside the invention, recognizing the validity of
a conditional licensing agreement as a derivative of a patent owner's power
to exploit the patent monopoly. 2  The Henry Court apparently considered
was held inapplicable in that case as the component manufactured by the alleged infringer, an
oval toilet paper roll, was found to be perishable and intended as a renewable part of the
patented toilet paper dispenser. 152 U.S. at 433. In dicta that foreshadowed the doctrine of
patent misuse, the Supreme Court stated that permitting the patent owner to monopolize the
market in unpatented articles would be equivalent to giving the owner a patent on the compo-
nents of the patented device. Id.
24. 213 U.S. 325 (1909). In explicitly recognizing the doctrine of contributory infringement,
the Supreme Court held that any person contributing to the infringement of a patented device,
by virtue of any activity that would facilitate such unauthorized use, was liable as an infringer.
The unpatented status of the components in a patented invention was considered irrelevant as to
the issue of contributory infringement. Id. at 333.
25. Id.
26. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
27. The Dawson Court characterized the Henry decision as the "highwater mark" of the
contributory infringement doctrine. 448 U.S. at 190, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 394.
28. The accused infringer argued that a condition restricting the use of the patented device
to buyers who agreed to purchase unpatented supplies manufactured by the patentee gives the
patent owner the power to extend his monopoly to embrace any article outside the claims of the
patent. The Henry Court dismissed that argument stating that such a situation does not cause the
unpatented goods to become patented. Acknowledging that competition in the market for the
unpatented items would be adversely affected, the Court declared that the effect would be
limited, and therefore permitted the conditional licensing practice. 224 U.S. at 31-32.
29. The decision to permit the patent owner to use a tying arrangement was justified by
reasoning that the market for the sale of unpatented components was created by the invention of
the patented device. Therefore, the patent owner is controlling that which he created and
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the encouragement of innovation through patent monopolies of greater im-
portance than the protection of competition in unpatented goods. Other
manufacturers competing in the sale of unpatented goods that were the
subject of a conditional licensing agreement were therefore vulnerable to a
contributory infringement suit.
In the years following Henry, the country became aware of the potential
for patent abuse and the evils of unchecked monopolies that might flourish
under the Court's liberal doctrine of contributory infringement. 30  The
Court first signaled its retreat from the principles enunciated in Henry when
it established the patent misuse doctrine in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 31 to offset the negative aspects of the
contributory infringement doctrine. 32  The plaintiff in Motion Picture
owned a patent on a film projector. The patented projection equipment was
sold to buyers accompanied by a notice conditioning the use of the projector
upon subsequent purchase and use of an unpatented film available from the
patent owner. The Court declared that a fundamental principle of patent
law maintains that an invention is delineated by the claims in the patent and
that the legal monopoly is limited to the invention itself. 33 The public policy
favoring competition in a free market for unpatented articles compelled the
Court to restrict the patentee's use of the legal monopoly. Any attempt to
extend the monopoly beyond the scope of the patented invention was held to
be unprotected by the patent grant. 34 The owner of the projection patent
was barred from bringing an infringement action because, by tying the use
of the patented invention to the purchase of an unpatented article outside the
patent grant, the patentee was deemed to have exceeded the bounds of the
cannot be accused of taking something from the market by monopolizing the supply of compo-
nent parts. 224 U.S. at 32.
30. Partially in response to the Henry opinion, in 1914 Congress passed § 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), aimed at condemning the use of certain tying schemes. See
International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 137 (1936).
31. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
32. The Supreme Court declared that prior decisions had confused the rights bestowed on
the inventor by the patent law and those rights an inventor might possess by virtue of contract
law. This led to the conclusion that a patentee possesses the right to impose any conditions upon
the use of the patented invention and to enforce those conditions through infringement actions.
The Court condemned the use restrictions as the "perfect instrument of favoritism and oppres-
sion" and held that the patent law could not be the source for such restrictions. Id. at 515.
33. 243 U.S. at 511. The Court in Motion Picture stated:
[T]he exclusive right granted in every patent must be limited to the invention
described in the claims of the patent and . . . it is not competent for the owner of a
patent by notice attached to its machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent
monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation but which
are no part of the patented invention .... The patent law furnishes no warrant for
such a practice and the cost, inconvenience and annoyance to the public which the





patent monopoly . 3  The Court expressly overruled Henry in the Motion
Picture decision. 36
Motion Picture not only established the doctrine of patent misuse but also
expressly condemned the use of tying arrangements. 37  In a number of
subsequent cases, patentees struggled to find some means of legitimately
using tying arrangements with patent licensing. 38 The Supreme Court con-
sistently held these arrangements to be patent misuse per se.3 9 It is generally
conceded, 40 however, that the Court's definitive statement concerning the
scope of the patent misuse doctrine and the vitality of the contributory
infringement doctrine prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 is
contained in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. (Mercoid 1)41
and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (Mercoid
35. Id. at 518-19.
36. Id. at 518.
37. See note 33 supra.
38. In Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Co., 283 U.S. 27, 8 U.S.P.Q.
211 (1931), users of a patented cardboard refrigeration package received implied licenses to use
the invention when they bought dry ice from the patent owner's licensee. The continued use of
the refrigeration device was explicitly conditioned upon the future purchase of dry ice from the
licensee. The Supreme Court barred the patent owner from obtaining relief against other dry ice
suppliers stating that the patent was used to secure a limited monopoly over unpatented material
used in applying the invention. Id. at 33-34, 8 U.S.P.Q. at 212-14. Patent owners seeking to
avoid the decision in Carbice thought they could escape the application of patent misuse if they
used implied licenses without explicitly requiring the purchase of unpatented goods as a condi-
tion to use the patented device. Such an attempt was condemned in Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber
Co., 302 U.S. 458, 36 U.S.P.Q. 35 (1938). In Leitch, the patent owner supplied all the articles
needed to apply the patented cement curing process to buyers, thereby granting them implied
licenses. The Supreme Court stated that every use of a patent to obtain a monopoly over
unpatented goods was prohibited, irrespective of the nature of the device employed to effect the
unauthorized extension. Id. at 463, 36 U.S.P.Q. at 36.
39. The patent owner in Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 U.S.P.Q. 30
(1942), licensed canning companies to use a patented salt dispensing machine conditioned upon
the purchase of salt from him. Use of the patent as a tying product to restrain competition in
unpatented articles, the tied product, barred the patentee from obtaining relief against alleged
infringement by competitors. Id. at 491, 52 U.S.P.Q. at 33.
One patent owner attempted to distinguish the tying scheme on the basis of the nonstaple
nature of the unpatented good being tied. In B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 52 U.S.P.Q.
33 (1942), the patent owner asserted that a tying scheme was permissible if the tied product was
a nonstaple good. This argument was explicitly rejected by the court of appeals. B.B. Chem. Co.
v. Ellis, 117 F.2d 829, 834-35, 48 U.S.P.Q. 487, 492-93 (1st Cir. 1941). Although the patent
owner advanced this argument in its petition for certiorari, there is a disagreement over whether
the Supreme Court considered it when handing down its decision in B.B. Chemical. See Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. at 194 n.12, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 395 n.12. The Court
found that consideration of degrees of economic practicality associated with the myriad of
licensing arrangements available to exploit a patent was an invalid basis for assessing the
legitimacy of the tying arrangement. 314 U.S. at 498, 52 U.S.P.Q. at 35.
40. See generally, Faber, Contributory Infringement-A Limited Tort, 42 CH.-KENT L.
REv. 1 (1965); Scafetta, supra note 4; Comment, A Brief Chronology of the Doctrine of
Contributory Infringement and the Defense of Misuse of the Patent Monopoly, 3 VILL. L. REV.
355 (1958); Note, Contributory Infringement, 41 B.U. L. REV. 547 (1961).
41. 320 U.S. 661, 60 U.S.P.Q. 21 (1944).
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1J).2 As the Mercoid decisions were important in bringing about the pas-
sage of section 271, each case must be examined closely.
In both suits the patent was owned by Mid-Continent and it set forth
claims covering a novel furnace stoker system. Mid-Continent exclusively
licensed Minneapolis-Honeywell to make, use, or sell the patented invention
and to grant sublicenses to others to do the same.13 Minneapolis-Honeywell
manufactured a stoker switch which was unpatented and essential to the
patented invention. Persons desiring to use the patented furnace system were
required to purchase the essential unpatented stoker switch from Minneap-
olis-Honeywell, and thereby received an implied license to use the patented
system. 4 4 Mid-Continent was paid a royalty by Minneapolis-Honeywell for
every switch sold. Mercoid manufactured and sold the same specially
adapted stoker switches, and refused a sublicense tendered by Minneapolis-
Honeywell. When sued by Mid-Continent and Minneapolis-Honeywell for
contributory infringement based upon its sale of the stoker switches, Mercoid
raised the defense of patent misuse.4 5 The Court held that Mid-Continent's
licensing scheme and Minneapolis-Honeywell's tying arrangement consti-
tuted patent misuse per se as each represented an attempt to extend the
monopoly to unpatented goods . 4  Dicta in the Mercoid I opinion suggested
that these two decisions abolished the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment.
4 7
The enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 followed the Court's Mercoid
decisions. The question remained as to what extent Congress intended sec-
tion 271 to modify those decisions. Did Congress intend section 271 to nullify
only the dicta in Mercoid I by establishing a statutory cause of action for
contributory infringement? Was section 271 also meant to signal a retreat
from the substantive holdings in the Mercoid cases? Could the congressional
purpose in enacting this statute have been to provide the patent owner with a
statutory grant of authority to control unpatented nonstaple components of
42. 320 U.S. 680, 60 U.S.P.Q. 30 (1944).
43. Mercoid 1, 320 U.S. at 663, 60 U.S.P.Q. at 23.
44. Id. If a patent owner sells an article which is capable of use only with the patented
invention, the sale of such an article impliedly grants to the purchaser the right to use the
patented invention. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249, 53 U.S.P.Q. 404,
408 (1942).
45. Mercoid 1, 320 U.S. at 662, 60 U.S.P.Q. at 23.
46. Id. at 663, 60 U.S.P.Q. at 25. Similarly, the Mercoid II decision declared that Minneap-
olis-Honeywell's tying scheme was patent misuse because it was an attempt to control competi-
tion in the unpatented article. 320 U.S. at 683-84, 60 U.S.P.Q. at 32. The rule against employing
a patent to secure a monopoly over an unpatented article was not altered, even though the
unpatented device was the heart of the invention, was the advance in the prior art, or was an
integral part of the structure embodying the patent. The Court found the absence of an outside
use for the unpatented component irrelevant to the issue of misuse.
47. Justice Douglas' dicta in Mercoid I has been cited as the major factor for congressional
efforts to codify the doctrine of contributory infringement. Justice Douglas wrote: "The result of
this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of
contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop and consider." 320 U.S.
at 669, 60 U.S.P.Q. at 26.
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the patented invention? The relationship between the Mercoid opinions and
section 271 has been the subject of continuing debate. 4 In attempting to
define this relationship, the Dawson Court concluded that a patent owner is
permitted to create a monopoly in supplying unpatented nonstaple goods
through a licensing program incorporating a tying arrangement.
FACTs AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 11, 1974, Rohm & Haas49 was issued a patent on a process for
selectively controlling weeds that grow in rice fields. 50 The patented
method involved the application of an unpatented chemical compound, 3,
4-dichloropropionanilide, commonly referred to as propanil. 51 On the day
the patent was issued to Rohm & Haas, it filed suit against Dawson Chemical
alleging patent infringement.5"
Dawson Chemical 53 sold propanil to buyers for use in controlling weeds in
rice fields long before Rohm & Haas received its patent. 54 In distributing its
propanil, Dawson Chemical included instructions that enabled the pur-
chaser to apply the chemical according to the method for which Rohm &
Haas later received a patent.5 5 After Rohm & Haas filed the infringement
suit, Dawson Chemical requested a royalty-bearing license from Rohm &
48. See Nelson, Mercoid-Type Misuse is Alive, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134, 142 (1974) (§ 271
intended to permit control of unpatented nonstaple components of invention only when alterna-
tive license allowed licensee to purchase unpatented components from source other than patent
owner); Scafetta, supra note 4 (§ 271 intended to signal retreat from the Mercoid decisions and
establish statutory cause of action for contributory infringement); Note, Contributory Infringe-
ment and Misuse- The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARV. L. REV. 909,
914-18 (1953) (dicta in Mercoid I nullified by § 271 but statute does not permit restriction of
competition condemned in Mercoid cases); Note, Combination Patents: The Right to Prohibit
Sales of Replacement Parts, 70 YALE L.J. 649, 656 (1961) (statute granted patentee exclusive
right to monopolize sale of components of invention); Note, Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of
1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132, 137 (1956) (language of § 271 gives no indication
that Congress intended to neutralize Mercoid holdings).
49. Rohm & Haas is also referred to as respondent throughout this Note.
50. The patent in suit was United States Patent No. 3,816,092. The patented method
virtually eliminated the need for deep water flooding and hand weeding of rice crops. Brief for
Respondent at 4-5, Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 206 U.S.P.Q. 385
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
51. Propanil is the active element of the patented method and functions as a selective
post-emergence herbicide, but is itself not patented. Monsanto Company owned a patent on
propanil that was declared invalid as a result of litigation between Monsanto and Rohm & Haas.
The court held that propanil was described in or taught by prior art. Monsanto Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 456 F.2d 592, 172
U.S.P.Q. 323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, 174 U.S.P.Q. 129 (1972).
52. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 206
U.S.P.Q. 385 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
53. Dawson Chemical is also referred to as petitioner throughout this Note.
54. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. 691, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
55. 448 U.S. at 183, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 391.
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Haas to supply buyers with propanil.56 Rohm & Haas refused the request and
stated that it would authorize the use of the patented invention only through
the purchase of its propanil . 7
Dawson Chemical moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
licensing practice used by Rohm & Haas constituted patent misuse as the
practice involved a tying arrangement and extended the patent monopoly to
unpatented goods .5  The district court granted the motion for summary
judgment . 5  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed and remanded for a trial on the merits, holding that Rohm & Haas'
conduct constituted nothing more than activities expressly permitted by
section 271(d).60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a 5-4 deci-
sion upheld the court of appeals."' The Court held that Rohm & Haas had
not engaged in conduct considered misuse either by its method of selling
propanil or by its refusal to license competitors to sell propanil.6 2
THE DAwsoN DECISION
The majority's decision was based on four propositions: (1) the language
and structure of section 271(d) protected the respondent's activities; (2) the
legislative history of the statute indicated that section 271(d) was meant to
change the patent law by retreating from the Mercoid decisions; (3) the facts
in Dawson were not significantly different from those in Mercoid and could
not be relied upon to place respondent's conduct beyond the protection of
section 271(d); and (4) the present construction of section 271(d) was not
foreclosed by decisions handed down after the enactment of the Patent Act of
1952.
Language and Structure of Section 217(d)
The Dawson Court perceived section 271(d) as a congressional effort to
reach a compromise between a patent owner's right to sue contributory
infringers and the application of the patent misuse defense. 3 This compro-
mise, in the Court's estimation, conceded the power to control nonstaple
goods6 4 used in a patented invention to the patent owner. Support for this
56. Brief for Petitioner, spra note 52, at 5.
57. Rohm & Haas manufactures and sells propanil in containers bearing instructions that
enable the buyer to practice the patented method of application. By operation of law, purchasers
of propanil receive implied licenses to use the patented process. Rohm & Haas, however, has not
offered or granted express licenses to either purchasers of propanil or competing suppliers. Brief
for Respondent, supra note 50, at 6-7.
58. 448 U.S. at 183, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 391.
59. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. 691, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
60. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1, 19 (5th
Cir. 1979).
61. 448 U.S. at 223, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 407-08.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 200-01, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 398.
64. See note 11 supra.
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conclusion was derived from the language of the three subsections of section
271(d). Pursuant to section 271(d), a patentee is permitted to (1) make and
sell nonstaple goods used in connection with an invention, (2) use a method
of licensing that does not involve explicit agreements, and (3) bring suit
against an alleged contributory infringer without fear that such an action
will be construed as an unlawful attempt to suppress competition. 5
In characterizing the conduct of the respondent in Dawson, the Court
stated: "[Rohm & Haas] sells propanil; it authorizes others to use propanil;
and it sues contributory infringers.""" The majority concluded that this
conduct was no different from conduct expressly protected by the statute. 7
The petitioner argued that Rohm & Haas had conditioned the right to use
the patented method upon the purchase of unpatented propani18 and the
Court conceded that this tying arrangement was not expressly covered by the
language of section 271(d).6 1 The Court acknowledged that the respondent's
conduct had the effect of suppressing competition in the sale of the unpat-
ented commodity, but nevertheless concluded that such a tying arrangement
did not extend the patent owner's control over the unpatented good beyond
that explicitly allowed by section 271(d). 70
Legislative History of Section 271(d)
Dawson Chemical argued that the purpose of section 271 was simply to
clarify the law of contributory infringement rather than to make any sub-
stantive changes. 7' The Court disagreed and reasoned that a statement by
Senator McCarren during the floor debate concerning the Patent Act sup-
ported the conclusion that the legislation was intended to change the patent
law. 72  Senator McCarren stated that the Patent Act included several
changes in response to prior Supreme Court decisions. 73 The committee
report on the bill from the House of Representatives74 also was relied upon to
bolster the view that the legislation had been intended to work major
changes in the patent law and eliminate confusion that had resulted from
prior court decisions. 75
Having concluded that one of the intended effects of the 1952 Patent Act
was to create significant substantive changes in the law, the Court evaluated
the legislative history to ascertain the meaning and scope of section 271. The
sources primarily relied upon for information about section 271 were the
65. See note 9 supra.
66. 448 U.S. at 202, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 9.
69. 448 U.S. at 202, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 19-22.
72. 448 U.S. at 203, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
73. 98 CONG. REc. 9323 (1952).
74. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
75. 448 U.S. at 203-04, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399-400.
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hearings that led to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952,76 particularly
the testimony of witnesses supporting and opposing section 271. 7 1
One of the bill's proponents, who testified before the congressional com-
mittee in 1948, stated that the purpose of sections 271(c) and (d) was to
reverse the trend of Supreme Court decisions that had indirectly eroded the
contributory infringement document. 78  Other proponents, the Court ob-
served, reinforced that view and added that the legislation was absolutely
necessary to nullify the adverse effects of Supreme Court opinions. 79  During
the 1949 congressional hearings on section 271, Giles Rich, one of the bill's
drafters, testified that restoration of contributory infringement through sec-
tion 271 was accomplished by retreating from the Supreme Court's Mercoid
opinions and by limiting the doctrine of patent misuse.80 This position was
reiterated by the bill's proponents during the 1951 hearings.8
Those opposing the bill, the Court stated, believed that the language of
section 271(d) would allow the owner of a patent to extend the monopoly
beyond the limits defined by previous Supreme Court decisions. 82  The
testimony of Department of Justice officials in response to Rich's statements
during the 1949 hearings, the Court asserted, confirmed that section 271(d)
was intended to nullify the Mercoid Court's interpretation of patent mis-
use.8 3  The Justice Department maintained its opposition throughout the
1951 hearings. 84  The majority in Dawson stated that the congressional
testimony revealed that Congress intended to grant a statutory right to
patent owners to control the nonstaple unpatented goods essential to the
patented invention.85 The Court declared that the tying arrangement used
by Rohm & Haas did not overstep the bounds of control permitted by the
statute.86
76. The Court relied upon three sets of hearings conducted over the course of four years: (1)
Hearings on H.R. 5988 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) (hearings of May 5, 7, and 12)
[hereinafter cited as 1948 Hearings]; (2) Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the
House Comm. on the judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (hearings of May 25 and June 3)
[hereinafter cited as 1949 Hearings]; (3) Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (hearings of June 12, 14, and 15)
[hereinafter cited as 1951 Hearings].
77. 448 U.S. at 204, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 400.
78. The Court cited a memorandum submitted to the congressional subcommittee by the
New York Patent Law Association that had helped draft the new bill. See 1948 Hearings, supra
note 76, at 3-6.
79. 448 U.S. at 205-06, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 400.
80. Giles Rich was a prominent patent attorney at the time he testified in favor of § 271
before the congressional subcommittees. Presently, Mr. Rich sits as a judge on the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. He argued vigorously in favor of reversing the Mercoid decisions
and reinstating contributory infringement as a viable basis for infringement suits. See 1949
Hearings, supra note 76, at 13-17.
81. 1951 Hearings, supra note 76, at 152.
82. 448 U.S. at 207, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 400.
83. Id. at 208-09, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 401-02.
84. 1951 Hearings, supra note 76, at 165-69.
85. 448 U.S. at 213-14, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 403.
86. Id., 206 U.S.P.Q. at 404.
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Reconciling the Facts in Dawson with Mercoid I & II
Rohm & Haas' method of exploiting its patent was found to be essentially
the same as the method condemned by the Mercoid Court.87 Having dem-
onstrated that the primary purpose of section 271 was to retreat from the
holding in Mercoid, the Court simply concluded that Rohm & Haas was
exempt from the allegation of patent misuse based upon its licensing prac-
tices. The Court recognized that Rohm & Haas, unlike the patent owner in
the Mercoid cases, refused to license its competitors. Dawson Chemical's
argument that this factual difference placed Rohm & Haas' conduct outside
the provisions of section 271(d) was rejected by the Court.8 8 Three reasons
were offered for rejecting this contention. First, the statute does not require a
patent owner to grant licenses to competitors supplying unpatented nonsta-
ple components. Second, the petitioner failed to produce any evidence from
the legislative history that the offer of a license to the accused infringer in the
Mercoid cases had been the catalyst for the congressional decision to nullify
those opinions. Finally, the Court concluded that the respondent's conduct
was compatible with the fundamental purpose of the patent grant, to pro-
vide the owner with the means for excluding others from profiting by the
patented invention. 9
Supreme Court Decisions Subsequent
to the Patent Act of 1952
Alternatively, the petitioner asserted that the interpretation of section
271(d) was foreclosed by previous Supreme Court decisions construing sec-
tion 271 and citing the Mercoid opinions as valid law. 0 The Dawson Court
considered the decisions cited by the petitioner 9' irrelevant as none of the
opinions directly involved an examination of section 271(d) or contributory
infringement.9 2  Moreover, the Court rejected the principles of statutory
construction set out in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.9 3 requiring
a "clear and certain signal from Congress" before the Court would authorize
an expansion of the patent monopoly by abandoning settled judicial princi-
87. Id. See notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra.
88. 448 U.S. at 214-15, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 404.
89. Id.
90. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 23-28.
91. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769 (1972)
(Mercoid opinions cited as support for limiting the invention to what is claimed in the patent);
Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 169 U.S.P.Q. 513
(1971) (Mercoid decisions characterized as an attempt to condemn unauthorized efforts to extend
the patent monopoly); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 161
U.S.P.Q. 577 (1969) (condemnation of tying schemes repeated); United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
371 U.S. 38, 135 U.S.P.Q. 201 (1962) (Mercoid cases cited as clear expression of judicial
proscription of any conduct involving use of patent to gain a monopoly over unpatented goods).
92. 448 U.S. at 216, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 405.
93. 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769 (1972).
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ples. 4 The Court dismissed Deepsouth because that case concerned only the
scope of direct infringement under section 271(a) and not section 271(d).15
Similarly, the Court reasoned that Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible
Replacement Top Co. (Aro 1)91 and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible
Replacement Top Co. (Aro 1I),97 which both involved the distinction be-
tween a lawful repair and an infringing reconstruction of a patented convert-
ible top, were not controlling. Although these cases arguably touched upon
issues similar to those in Dawson,99 neither opinion directly addressed the
problem of the intended effect of section 271(d) upon patent misuse. Aro I,
the Court concluded, involved the issue of direct infringement, and reliance
on the Mercoid decisions merely reflected the Court's endorsement of the
principle that the single components of a combination patent are not within
the patent monopoly.99 The decision in Aro II was similarly dismissed. 00 The
Court did acknowledge, however, that the Aro II opinion stated that section
271 was enacted to overrule any blanket invalidation of the contributory
infringement doctrine found in the Mercoid opinions.' 0' Nevertheless, the
Dawson Court asserted that its review of the legislative history of section 271
was not out of harmony with the Aro II analysis.10 2 The fundamental differ-
ence between the Aro cases and Dawson, the Court pointed out, was that
Aro I & II concerned a replacement-repair market and Dawson dealt with a
primary use market for a chemical process.10 3
94. See notes 127-133 and accompanying text infra.
95. 448 U.S. at 216, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 405.
96. 365 U.S. 336, 128 U.S.P.Q. 354 (1961). The patent owner invented a convertible top
used in the manufacture of automobiles. The alleged infringer sold the fabric used in the
convertible top to car owners. For more background on the facts in Aro 1, see Note, Patents-In-
fringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-Repair and Reconstruction, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 952
(1961).
97. 377 U.S. 476, 141 U.S.P.Q. 681 (1964). The Aro II case involved essentially the same
facts as presented in Aro . The alleged infringer was deemed to have engaged in infringing
conduct by selling the special convertible top fabric to unlicensed automobile manufacturers. See
generally Conner, The Second Aro Case: A Realignment of the Supreme Court on the Matter of
Contributory Infringement of a Combination Patent, 34 U. CIN. L. REV. 123 (1965); Note,
Patents-Contributory Infringement-History and Trend: Convertible Top Cases, 14 DEPAUL
L. REV. 473 (1965).
98. 448 U.S. at 216-17, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 405. The Aro cases were similar in that the Court
was presented with questions involving contributory infringement under § 271.
99. Id. at 217, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 405. In Aro I Justice Black concluded that the language and
history of the Patent Act of 1952 demonstrated that Congress wanted to codify but not expand
the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement. In addition, Congress intended to permit
patent owners to assert claims of contributory infringement without having such conduct be the
basis for denying the patentee relief against direct infringement. Most importantly, Justice Black
found that the traditional limitations on the scope of the patent monopoly were not intended to
be altered by the enactment of the new patent law. 365 U.S. at 347-50, 128 U.S.P.Q. at 359-61.
The Dawson Court dismissed Justice Black's statement in Aro I as simply inconsistent with its
interpretation of § 271. 448 U.S. at 218 n.22, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 405 n.22.
100. Id. at 219, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 406.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 220, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 406-07.
103. The primary use market for the patented invention refers to the initial sale or licensing of
the invention to users by the patent owner, whereas the replacement-repair market deals with
1981] DAWSON CHEMICAL COMPANY 889
CRITICISM
The fundamental issue before the Dawson Court was the statutory inter-
pretation of section 271(d). 0 4  The validity of the decision depends upon
whether the Supreme Court properly construed the statute according to
traditional principles of statutory construction. 0 5 The most persuasive
source of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. If the statute's
plain language fails to reveal this intent, then the legislative history, consist-
ing of the committee reports, floor debate, and congressional hearings, must
provide the requisite evidence of congressional purpose. 06 When evaluated
under these principles, the plain language of section 271(d) does not support
the result reached by the Dawson Court. Nor do the traditional secondary
sources of legislative intent pertaining to section 271(d) sustain the construc-
tion of that statute found in the Dawson opinion.
The plain language of section 271(d) grants the patent owner the right to
engage in three types of activities without being guilty of patent misuse.10 7
None of the three subsections contain any language that expressly permits a
patentee to condition the right to use the patented device upon the purchase
of an unpatented article. The Court conceded 10 that the language of section
271(d) does not expressly cover the tying arrangement employed by the
respondent in Dawson.09 Thus, the statute's plain language does not sustain
the Court's position that Congress intended to grant a patent owner the right
to exploit the patent through tying arrangements, let alone the right to
the sale of the unpatented components to users of the patented device. Apparently the legal
distinction was based upon the premise that preserving competition is a legitimate concern in a
replacement market as there are already authorized owners of the invention with the right to
repair or replace worn out parts. In a primary use market the fundamental premise is that no
buyers are authorized until licensed by the patent owner to use the invention. Therefore
competition in a primary use market fosters infringing conduct.
104. 448 U.S. at 179, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 389.
105. See 2A C.D. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.05 (4th ed. 1973); Frank-
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).
106. Mr. Justice Reed in United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940),
stated:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation.
In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to
absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the
policy of the legislation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather
than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in
the statute, is available, there can certainly be no "rule of law" which forbids its use,
however clear the words may be on superficial examination.
Id. at 543-44.
107. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)-(3) (1976).
108. 448 U.S. at 202, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
109. See note 57 supra.
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monopolize the market for an unpatented nonstaple component of a pat-
ented invention.
The alternative sources of congressional intent derived from legislative
materials are generally found in the committee reports and the record of the
congressional floor debate that usually accompany the enactment of new
legislation. The Dawson Court relied heavily upon the legislative history of
section 271(d) in determining that Congress intended to exclude the paten-
tee's system of tying unpatented goods to the use of the patent from the
charge of misuse."' ° Both the House of Representatives and the Senate
reports on the Patent Act of 1952, however, stated that the main purpose of
section 271 was "clarification and stabilization." III These reports contain
no language expressly indicating that Congress intended to give patent
owners the right to use tying schemes and escape the charge of patent misuse.
The majority in Dawson noted that the Senate and House reports on the 1952
Act gave cursory attention to the specific features of the new law," 2 but in
the Court's estimation the congressional reports revealed an effort to enact
substantive changes in the patent laws." 3 This conclusion, even if accurate,
falls far short of the blanket authorization of tying arrangements involving
nonstaple goods that the Dawson Court endorsed. The reports do not contain
the slightest indication that Congress desired to extend the patent monopoly
beyond previously recognized limits to cover unpatented nonstaple ar-
ticles."' In fact, the record of the Senate floor debate on the 1952 Act casts
doubt upon the Court's position that the legislation was meant to effect
substantial changes in the patent laws." 5 Even assuming that some substan-
tive changes were incorporated into the massive congressional effort to codify
all the patent laws in a single title, the congressional reports and floor debate
provide no insight as to the particular changes that may have been intended.
The remaining source of legislative history cited frequently in the Dawson
opinion was testimony given during the committee hearings "6 that led to the
enactment of the Patent Act of 1952. To buttress its interpretation of section
271(d), the Court relied mainly upon the statements of witnesses before the
committees, ' 7 frequently citing the testimony of Giles Rich." 8 In the 1949
110. 448 U.S. at 202-03, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
111. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1952).
112. 448 U.S. at 203, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
113. Id. at 204, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 399.
114. See note 33 supra.
115. Prior to the Senate vote on the Patent Act of 1952, Senator McCarran, who was
chairman of the Senate committee that had conducted the hearings on the bill, was asked the
following question by Senator Saltonstall: "Does the bill change the law in any way or only
codify the present patent laws?" Senator McCarran replied, "It codifies the present patent laws."
98 CONG. REC. 9323 (1952) (emphasis added).
116. 1948 Hearings, 1949 Hearings and 1951 Hearings, supra note 76.
117. The Court's reliance on the testimony of witnesses before congressional committees as a
guide to the construction of a statute in contravention of the intent apparently expressed in the
committee reports and congressional debate is a questionable application of the principles of
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hearings, Mr. Rich and other proponents of the new law argued that to
revive contributory infringement, deemed essential in the aftermath of the
Mercoid decisions, it would be necessary to restrict the scope of patent
misuse. This. restriction was to be accomplished by exempting certain acts
from the purview of the doctrine.1"' Based on this testimony, the Court
reasoned that section 271(d) would allow the patentee to control those goods
like the switches in the Mercoid cases.12 0  Other testimony, largely ignored
by the Court, suggests that some proponents characterized section 271(d) as a
remedial measure aimed at protecting those patent owners, like the one in
Mercoid, who were willing to license others to supply the unpatented nonsta-
ple components of the invention.' 2'
In the 1951 hearings, Mr. Rich again pressed for the passage of section
271(d) to nullify the patent misuse application found in Mercoid. 22  His
testimony indicates, however, that the intended effect of section 271 did not
include expansion of the patentee's monopoly powers to encompass unpat-
ented nonstaple components. Although the Court asserted that testimony
given by Department of Justice officials indicated they believed that section
271(d) would permit the use of tying arrangements, 12 3 this interpretation was
refuted by Representative Crumpacker. 24 When asked by Crumpacker if
statutory construction. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1931)
(statements made to congressional committee found without weight in the interpretation of a
statute). See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 223-24, 206 U.S.P.Q.
385, 408 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
118. See note 81 supra.
119. 448 U.S. at 208, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 401.
120. Id.
121. Stephen Cerstvik testifed before the congressional committee on behalf of the Aircraft
Industries Association. He stated:
Manufacturers of unpatented nonstaple components could avoid liability as contrib-
utory infringers, prior to the Mercoid cases, by obtaining a license from the patent
owner and paying him royalties on the sale of the unpatented components for use in
the patented combination. At present, and as a result of the decisions of the Mercoid
cases, this cannot be done without the danger of the patent owner subjecting himself
to the possible charge that he is misusing his patent to control the sale of unpatented
products by the collection of royalties on the sale of such unpatented products.
1949 Hearings, supra note 76, at 26. Giles Rich, during the same hearings, testified that:
The courts would say ... if they logically follow the Mercoid case, that the granting
of this license [to a competing producer of nonstaple goods] is a misuse because you
are attempting to collect royalties from somebody under your patent for doing
something which, per se, is not an infringement of your patent. It is not covered by
your claim.
id. at 16.
122. 448 U.S. at 210-11, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 402.
123. Id., 206 U.S.P.Q. at 403.
124. Mr. Crumpacker responded to the interpretation of § 271(d) advanced by the Depart-
ment of Justice by stating:
It seems to me that the language is clear, and it says that he shall not be denied relief
or be deemed guilty of misuse because of having done any of these three things. It
doesn't say the reverse of that, that because of having done these things he shall be
deemed not guilty of misuse.
1951 Hearings, supra note 76, at 167.
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such monopolistic practices would still be susceptible to the patent misuse
doctrine, Mr. Rich responded that section 271(d) would not prevent such
acts from being characterized as patent misuse. 125
A careful review of the legislative history discloses no clear congressional
intent to tolerate a patentee's attempt to extend the legal monopoly to
unpatented nonstaple goods. It may be argued, however, that section 271(d)
was intended to implicitly authorize the use of tying arrangements with
patent licensing. Still, it is obvious that neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history of the Patent Act presents a clear and certain signal
that Congress intended section 271(d) to expand the monopoly power of a
patent owner to cover unpatented nonstaple goods.
Yet, absent a clear statement of congressional intent, the Dawson Court
should not have construed a statutory provision as expanding monopoly
rights in conflict with prior case law. 12  Indeed, prior cases required a clear
expression of congressional intent where a patent owner argued that section
271 was intended to extend the reach of the patent privilege while making
the area of public use narrower than previously established by the courts.
Such an argument was advanced in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp. 27  In that case, the Court held that section 271 was to be strictly
construed "in light of this Nation's historical antipathy to monopoly and of
repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster competition." 128 An
argument based upon ambiguous statutory language was deemed insufficient
by the Deepsouth Court to support the expansion of patent rights that would
require overruling or modifying prior case law. 129 The Court concluded in
Deepsouth that only a "clear and certain signal from Congress" would be
sufficient to compel the Court to sanction any widening of patent monopoly
rights beyond previously delineated bounds. 130
125. The exchange between Mr. Crumpacker and Mr. Rich was as follows:
MR. CRUMPACKER: As you interpret this paragraph (d) as it now reads, would it in
any way prevent a court from holding the monopolistic practices referred to as being
a misuse of a patent? That is, where a patentee has actually been engaged in trying
to gain a limited monopoly of unpatented articles through the use of a patent.
MR. RIcH: The answer is that (d) would not prevent their being held, the acts being
held to be misuse.
1951 Hearings, supra note 76, at 173-74. The Dawson Court rejected the petitioner's interpreta-
tion of this exchange. 448 U.S. at 213-14 n.20, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 404 n.20.
126. See notes 127-133 and accompanying text infra.
127. 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769 (1972).
128. Id. at 530, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 773-74.
129. The Deepsouth Court enunciated the principles of statutory construction to be applied in
cases where a patent owner argues that legislation was intended to extend the patent monopoly:
"It follows that we should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases
construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on more
than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language." Id. at 531, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 774.
130. "We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the
position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider,
and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought." Id.
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The Dawson Court dismissed any consideration of the Deepsouth decision
because that case required the Court to interpret section 271(a), not section
271(d).1 3 1  Nevertheless, the principles of statutory construction contained in
Deepsouth are no less compelling when a patent owner relies upon section
271(d) as the basis for permitting an expansion of the patent privilege. 32
Neither the language of section 271(d) nor its legislative history provides "a
clear and certain signal" that Congress intended to expand the patent mo-
nopoly in either of the two ways asserted by the respondent in Dawson.13
Absent a clear signal from Congress authorizing a change in the status of the
patent monopoly, principles enunciated in Deepsouth should have compelled
the Court to reject both of the respondent's claims in Dawson and apply
prior case law to find the patent owner had misused the patent.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Important policy objectives cannot be ignored when a question of statu-
tory construction bears upon the interface of the patent and antitrust
laws. 3 4 Contributory infringement is an extension of the policy objectives
of the patent law. 35  Correspondingly, patent misuse, with respect to tying
arrangements, reflects the concerns of the antitrust laws. 3  Congress has
not indicated with any clarity or certainty whether a patent owner can use a
tying arrangement to create a monopoly in the market supplying an unpat-
ented nonstaple article. 13 7 Absent a statutory solution the Court should have
considered the implications of its ruling in Dawson for both antitrust and
patent policy. 3 8
131. 448 U.S. at 216, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 405.
132. The statutory principles of Deepsouth have been relied upon by the Supreme Court in
cases requiring the interpretation of sections of the Patent Act other than 271. In Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978), the Court found that a mathematical formula forming
the only novel feature of a process for updating alarm limits in the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons was unpatentable. In refusing to recognize that the subject matter was patentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), the Court quoted the Deepsouth statutory principles as indicating
that caution should be used when courts are asked to extend patent rights. Id. at 596, 198
U.S.P.Q. at 200.
133. See notes 106-111 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 121-125 and accompany-
ing text supra.
134. See, e.g., Bowes, The Patent-Antitrust Law Interface: How Should It Be Defined?, 18
IDEA 25 (1976); Kidwell, Patent-Right Interchange and Antitrust Policy: Defining the Inter-
face, 43 U. CoLo. L. REV. 369 (1972); Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent
Rights and the Public Interest, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 178 (1970); Stedman, The Patent-
Antitrust Interface, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 316 (1976).
135. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 106-111 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 121-125 and accompany-
ing text supra.
138. When the objective of statutory interpretation is to determine whether a patent owner's
conduct is a legitimate exercise of his or her legal monopoly, it is crucial that the courts not adopt
a rigid per se rule to resolve the question. Well-settled principles of antitrust and patent law may
have different effects when applied to the facts of one case as opposed to another. A particular
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Had the Court balanced the policy objectives of the antitrust and patent
laws, it might have opted for a more cautious and reasonable resolution to
the Dawson conflict. A tying scheme can enhance the economic reward
received by a patent owner making the legal monopoly more profitable to
the inventor. Increasing the remunerative aspects of the patent monopoly
promotes the policy objectives of the patent law. Conversely, requiring the
patent owner to license competitors that supply the tied product fosters
competition favored by the antitrust laws. Permitting the use of a tying
arrangement only when competition in the unpatented nonstaple component
is maintained represents a balanced approach toward resolving the policy
conflict present in Dawson.
This balanced, moderate solution to the questions raised in Dawson could
have been justified by a slightly different interpretation of the language and
legislative history of section 271(d). To resolve the central problem in Daw-
son-the permissibility of a tying arrangement-it was necessary to deter-
mine the judicial attitude toward these arrangements prior to the passage of
section 271 and what effect, if any, this judicial treatment had on the
drafting of the staute.131
Before the statute's enactment, the judicial doctrine of patent misuse,
created to reflect the policy objectives of the antitrust laws, was relied upon
by the courts to prohibit the use of any tying arrangements by a patent
owner. 40  Patent misuse preserves competition by ensuring that a patentee
shall not extend the legal monopoly beyond the limits of the patent grant. A
tying arrangement under certain circumstances is a per se violation of the
antitrust laws.' 4' In analyzing tying arrangements under the doctrine of
course of conduct may have quite distinct results depending upon the circumstances. Conse-
quently, the public interest is best served by the application of a rule of reason. A judicial inquiry
into the total factual context surrounding a particular course of conduct will lead to a determina-
tion of the issue that protects the patent owner's rights as well as the public interest. See generally
Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent Rights and the Public Interest, 52 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 178 (1970); Stedman, The Patent-Antitrust Interface, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
316 (1976).
139. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
140. See Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 U.S.P.Q. 30 (1942) (tying use of
patented dispensing machine to purchase of salt tablets held to be misuse); Leitch Mfg. Co. v.
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 36 U.S.P.Q. 35 (1938) (tying purchase of unpatented bituminous
emulsion to use of patented process for curing cement held misuse); Carbice Corp. v. American
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 8 U.S.P.Q. 211 (1931) (tying use of a patented refrigeration
package to purchase of dry ice was patent misuse); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (requiring the purchase of unpatented film to use patented
projection equipment deemed misuse).
141. The core of the present antitrust policy is represented by three main statutes: (1)
Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); (2) Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); and
(3) Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976). Tying arrangements may violate
antitrust laws under § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Sherman Act. "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Sherman Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) states:
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patent misuse prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, the courts
applied a rigid rule similar to the application of antitrust laws. 42  The
enactment of section 271 was largely a response to the problems created by
the harsh applications of the patent misuse doctrine.'4 3 Even so, the lan-
guage of section 271(d) is that of exceptions to the misuse doctrine and not a
wholesale grant of statutory immunity to a patent owner who creates a
monopoly in the market supplying the unpatented nonstaple component.
Congress did not intend section 271(d) to endorse or reject tying arrange-
ments per se. Instead, it appears that Congress adopted a more balanced
approach to the conflicting policy considerations that are ever present when
patent law interacts with antitrust law. Congress was apparently trying to
modify the Court's view that some conduct was patent misuse per se irrespec-
tive of the actual effect it might have had on competition. If the Dawson
Court had accepted this interpretation of section 271(d), then the logical
result would have been to permit the use of tying arrangements only under
circumstances where competition in the market supplying the nonstaple
component would not be eliminated. 44 The Court held, however, that the
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for
use, consumption or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agree-
ment, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in
the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale,
or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce.
Id.
The general rules outlined by the Supreme Court deem a tying arrangement to violate § 3 of the
Clayton Act when the seller enjoys a monopoly in the market for the tying product or if a
substantial volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained. When both conditions result
from using a tying scheme then such arrangements are violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In
addition, the courts will hold a tying arrangement unreasonable per se whenever the seller has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competi-
tion in the market for the tied product and an appreciable amount of interstate commerce is
affected. The owner of a patent on a tying device will be deemed in all cases to possess sufficient
economic power to restrain free competition in the tied product. See NORIDAUS, PATENT-
ANTITRUST LAW § 84c, at 1-2 (1977). See also Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrange-
ments: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1980).
142. The most rigid application of the patent misuse doctrine appears in the Mercoid deci-
sions. The Supreme Court stated that extending the patent monopoly to any unpatented articles
via a tying arrangement constituted patent misuse per se. Proponents of § 271 testifying before
congressional committees indicated that the Mercoid rule was too rigid and that more flexibility
should be interjected into the patent misuse doctrine in situations involving nonstaple goods and
a patent owner willing to license competitors. See notes 46-47, 121 and accompanying text supra.
143. See note 48 supra.
144. The interpretation of § 271(d) offered by the suggested approach would permit Rohm &
Haas to condition the right to use the patented application process upon the purchase of propanil
only if licensees could obtain the unpatented propanil from a source other than Rohm & Haas.
Competition in the market supplying propanil could be preserved if Rohm & Haas granted
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respondent was free to use a tying arrangement to monopolize the sale of
propanil. The Court ignored the policy objectives favoring competition and
instead applied the rigid Mercoid rule in reverse by holding that regardless of
the effect on the competition, tying arrangements are not a misuse of the
patent when they involve unpatented nonstaple goods.
IMPACT
The impact of the Dawson decision was quickly recognized by the chemi-
cal industry as sanctioning the monopolization of unpatented nonstaple
chemical components of a patented process. 145  It is probable that other
owners of patents incorporating nonstaple components will seek to establish
the same monopoly using their patents. Undoubtedly, as patent owners take
advantage of the new monopoly power created by Dawson, effects will be
felt among suppliers of unpatented nonstaple components, users of the pat-
ented inventions that require such components, and quite possibly courts
that process contributory infringement litigation.
A patent owner has to follow only the simple implied licensing scheme
used by the respondent in Dawson 146 to eliminate all domestic sources of
supply for the nonstaple component of the patented invention. The result is
that those wishing legally to practice the patented invention are required to
purchase an essential element from only one source, the owner of the patent.
Consequently, the benefits of market competition are destroyed. Buyers of
the nonstaple good will no longer be able to select a supplier that provides
the best product at the lowest price on terms and conditions a buyer's
business might require. Unrestricted supply of goods in a free market encour-
ages price flexibility by ensuring that one supplier will be able to provide
goods when buyers believe a competitor's price is too high. When the patent
owner is the exclusive source for nonstaple components that price flexibility
is undermined. The patent owner is able to set his or her price at a level that
could not be maintained normally in a competitive market. 147 Under these
royalty-bearing licenses to other propanil producers. Rohm & laas could also license rice
farmers directly to practice the patented application method with a royalty to be paid based
upon the volume of propanil used by the farmer. In addition, the same royalty arrangement
could be extended to persons who are sprayers or applicators of propanil. The patent law does
grant the patent owner the exclusive right to his invention and Rohm & Haas would be within
that right if it practiced the patented method itself by spraying rice fields and not licensing
anyone. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 30.
145. Two weeks after the Supreme Court handed down the Dawson decision, a trade journal
of the chemical industry reported that a process patent "can be used to monopolize the sale of a
chemical in the U.S., if that compound is a nonstaple item." See CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, July
14, 1980, at 68.
146. See note 57 supra.
147. In a market where there is only one supplier of the product, the output is controlled by
that supplier. By decreasing the supply of available product the monopolist can raise the price
for the article. If there were more suppliers, the output could not be manipulated to raise the
price of the product. See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 8-9 (1976).
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circumstances, there is no longer any incentive to refine production facilities
or to invent new methods of producing the nonstaple good more effi-
ciently. 48 Indeed, the supplier of the nonstaple goods will be able to dictate
the terms and conditions of a sale to the buyer. The inflated costs usually
created by a monopoly will be passed along to consumers of the products
manufactured by the industry employing the patented invention. For those
small businesses that cannot absorb the inflated costs created by the monop-
oly the effect will prevent them from competing with larger users of the
patented invention. This ripple effect of a monopoly continues to affect
competition in related industries and the economic burdens will be borne
ultimately by the consuming public.
It is equally possible that the courts themselves will feel the impact of the
Dawson decision directly through an increase in contributory infringement
litigation. The economic advantages of being able to derive profits from a
patented process or method simply by supplying the essential nonstaple
components of the invention in a market free from competition are enor-
mous. l4 9  Of course, before being able to establish that a patent owner is
entitled to use the power created by the Dawson opinion, the patentee must
prove that the unpatented component is essential to the invention and is a
nonstaple without a substantial noninfringing use. 50 If the question of a
component's staple/nonstaple status is arguable, a patent owner may be
encouraged to sue all competing suppliers as contributory infringers in an
effort to establish the monopoly. Consequently, there could be a tremendous
surge in new contributory infringement litigation. The prospect of pro-
tracted and expensive court battles could force competitors to withdraw
from the market creating de facto monopolies over allegedly nonstaple
goods. Increased litigation could place new demands on the already bur-
dened court system and push up costs for the parties involved. Again, the
taxpayer and the consuming public will bear the economic burden.
CONCLUSION
The Court's expansion of the patent monopoly privilege in the Dawson
decision could have been avoided by balancing the policy objectives em-
bodied in the contributory infringement and patent misuse doctrines.' 51 A
balanced approach to the decision would have protected the patentee's privi-
lege to derive economic benefit from the patent by permitting the use of
148. "Monopolists ... can also maximize profits by minimizing their costs at each output
level, but, without the goad of intense price competition, they may fail to do so. They may
tolerate obsolescent equipment, swollen bureacracy and outworn production techniques." P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 20 (1974).
149. See notes 147-148 and accompanying text supra.
150. The language of § 271(d) is ancillary to § 271(c) which defines contributory infringement
in terms of articles which are not staple items suitable for substantial noninfringing use. See note
9 supra.
151. Ms. Mary Jones, former Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, speaking to
the impact of the patent and antitrust laws on consumers stated:
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tying arrangements. Yet competition among suppliers of the unpatented
nonstaple components could have been preserved. 5 2 The power to monopo-
lize the sale of unpatented nonstaple components, recognized by the Dawson
opinion, is a powerful economic incentive to exploit a patented invention by
using tying arrangements. The result could be an unnecessary increase in
contributory infringement suits and increased costs to consumers.
Stephen Francis Sherry
If we still believe in the goals of our antitrust laws to prevent the exercise of private
monopolies and to promote competition as a viable means of achieving our basic
social and economic objectives, then we cannot virtually eliminate their application
in the patent field without seriously compromising and rendering essentially mean-
ingless our larger goals of regulating the exercise of market power through antitrust
laws and creating the type of competitive environment so essential for the welfare of
our citizens and the health and prosperity of the nation.
M. JONES, THE IMPACT OF THE PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS ON CONSUMERS in ANTITRUST
PRIMER: PATENTS, FRANCHISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 57 (1970).
152. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
